Published papers:

A.V. Zakharov, A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 2008, 48(9-10): 1527-1553

This work studies a two-candidate single-dimensional Downsian voting model with variable voter turnout. I consider a one-shot game between two candidates, where the payoffs of the candidates are their vote shares, and the strategy set of each candidate is a one-dimensional set of policy positions. The utility that a voter attributes to a candidate is linear in both the absolute distance between the candidate’s policy position and the voter’s preferred policy, and in the electorate’s bias toward the candidate (known as the candidate’s valence). I assume that the voter decides to abstain if either they are indifferent between the two candidates, or significantly dissatisfied with both candidates; otherwise, the voter votes for the candidate they prefer. I show that under any of the two assumptions about voting behavior, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists under a broad range of conditions, even if the valence of one of the candidates is nonzero. In either case, the candidates do not always choose identical policy positions. I then study how the positions of the candidates, their relative shares of vote, and turnout depend on the distribution of voter preferences and candidate valence.

A.V.Zakharov, A model of candidate location with endogenous valence, Public Choice, 2009, 138: 347–366

This work gives a theoretical explanation for the increase in campaign spending and party polarization in U.S. politics. I assume that the effectiveness of persuasive advertising, and of costly valence campaigning in general, positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters. A decline in the number of partisan voters in a constituency results in greater campaign spending by the candidates. If the voters are risk-averse, the candidates who maximize their expected office rents minus the cost of campaigning will choose divergent policy platforms strategically in order to reduce the costs of subsequent campaign spending. The degree of policy divergence positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters for a broad class of voter disutility and candidate cost of valence functions. (Russian version)

N. Schofield, A.V. Zakharov. A stochastic model of 2007 Russian Duma election. Public Choice, forthcoming

In this paper we consider the nature of local Nash equilibrium (LNE) for a model of the 2007 Duma election in Russia, using estimates of valence obtained from sociodemographic variables. We then extend this sociodemographic valence model by including institutional valences, the approval by voters of the various institutions, including the President, the Prime Minister, the State Duma and the Federation Council. We show by simulation that the vote maximizing LNE of this general stochastic model were not at the electoral origin. The dominant feature of the election was the influence of approval or disapproval of President Putin on each voter’s political choice.

Papers submitted to journals:

On the equivalence of some solution concepts in spatial voting theory. With Valerii Marakulin (2009)

Submitted to Economics Letters

We prove that, for a spatial voting setting with non-Euclidian preferences, the locally uncovered set, proposed by Schofield (1999), is closely related to the dimensionby- dimension median of Shepsle (1979). It is shown that every point in the interior of the locally uncovered set can be supported as a dimension-by-dimension median by some set of basis vectors for the space of alternatives. Moreover, for a two dimensional policy space, the locally uncovered set and the set of dimension-by-dimension medians coincide.

Non-convergence in two-candidate probabilistic voting model. (2008)

Revise and resubmit, Social Choice and Welfare

I propose a generalization of the probabilistic voting model in two-candidate elections. Unlike in all previous works, I assume that the candidates have general von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions defined over the voting outcomes. For a finite number of voters, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a local Nash equilibrium in which the policy platforms of the candidates are identical. The convergent equilibrium exists only if a certain condition on the probability of voting functions is satisfied, and/or a strict symmetry condition on the candidate utility functions is satisfied. Both widely studied special cases --- probability of win-maximizers and voteshare-maximizers --- satisfy the latter condition. Hence, policy coincidence will not exist in the general case, although Banks and Duggan (2005) have shown that every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium will exhibit convergence for voteshare-maximizing candidates and a broad class of probability of voting functions.

Working papers:

Campaign spending and the role of ideology (in Russian) (2005)

Candidate location and endogenous valence. (2005)

Contest theory (a review of literature) (in Russian) (2003)

Unpublished works:

Spatial voting models: A review of literature (2006)

Voting in 2007 Russian legislative elections: The role of Putin's approval and ideology (2009) (shorter version in Russian)

Idiosyncratic issue salience in spatial voting models: The cases of Netherlands, UK, and Israel. With D. Fantazzini. (2008)

Estimating the Effect of Activists in Elections under Plurality Rule and Proportional

Representation: Comparing the United States and Israel. With N. Schofield, Christopher Claassen, and

Ugur Ozdemir (2008)

Party Positioning under Proportional Representation and Plurality Rule. With Norman Schofield, Christopher Claassen, Ugur Ozdemir, and Evan Schnidman (2008)

An alterantive approach to ML estimation of multinomial choice models (2009)